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During the period 1949 to 1963 civil defence in Canada developed in a number of stages that 
reflected changes in technology, weaponry and 
scientific discovery. The first stage of development, 
roughly between 1949 and 1952, witnessed only 
minor developments. Civil defence followed the 
Second World War practice, with a focus on air 
raid shelters and, if possible, evacuation. In the 
years 1952 to 1954 as the possibility of a nuclear 
attack became more real as a result of the Soviet 
development of intercontinental bombers, civil 
defence officials moved towards a policy of mass 
evacuation of target areas and the rescue of 
survivors. The detonation of a hydrogen bomb 
and the discovery of radioactive fallout in 1954 
led to yet another change in civil defence plans. 
Civil defence officials became more convinced that 
mass evacuation of target areas was the answer, 
however, fallout shelters were also recommended 
for those areas outside the target area likely to 
be blanketed with radioactive debris. In the late 
1950s and into the early 1960s civil defence again 
had to be redefined as intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) were developed and evacuation 
was no longer possible as nuclear attack could 
occur virtually without warning. 
 Responsibility for civil defence was divided 
amongst all three levels of government – federal, 
provincial, and municipal. At the federal level, 
responsibility for civil defence first fell under 
the Department of National Defence and 
Minister Brooke Claxton. The development 
of civil defence policy was the responsibility 
of Federal Civil Defence Coordinator, Major-
General F.F. Worthington,1 who oversaw most 
civil defence issues at the federal level. In 1951 
responsibility was transferred to the Department 
of National Health and Welfare, and its minister, 
Paul Martin. In 1959, responsibility for civil 
defence was again reallocated, this time to three 
departments: the Department of National Defence, 
a committee within the Privy Council called the 
Emergency Measures Organization (EMO), and 
the Department of National Health and Welfare. 
This lasted until the mid-1960s when the Lester 
B. Pearson government transferred responsibility 
for civil defence to the Department of Defence 
Production.2
 The organization of civil defence at the 
provincial level reflected that of the federal 
government. In Ontario, responsibility for civil 
defence fell to a newly-formed civil defence 
committee which was made up of the deputy 
cabinet ministers, a civil defence coordinator, 
and emergency officials such as the Ontario 
Fire Marshal and the Ontario Provincial Police 
Commissioner. Following the transfer of civil 
defence to the federal Emergency Measures 
Organization (EMO), a provincial EMO was also 
formed, but membership remained virtually 
unchanged from the structure of the Civil Defence 
Committee.3
 Civil defence organization at the municipal 
level varied greatly. A general structure, set out 
in an Ontario government document, called 
for the appointment of a Civil Defence Control 
Committee to be composed of the following: the 
mayor, a quorum of municipal council, and a 
selection of prominent citizens from industry, 
the clergy, the press, the Canadian Legion, 
service groups, the Red Cross, and St. John’s 
Ambulance.4 
 On 23 September 1949 the President of the 
United States, Harry S. Truman, announced that 
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the Soviet Union had successfully completed an 
atomic test.5 Following Truman’s announcement, 
press reports focused on the Soviet Union’s 
technological achievement, and questions as to 
how the Soviet Union managed to complete a 
nuclear weapon much earlier than expected, only 
four years after the United States. Editorials in 
the Globe & Mail and Montreal Gazette stressed 
that the Soviet atomic test posed little threat to 
the western world, and that “nothing more has 
happened than what was bound to happen.”6 In 
the month following the Soviet atomic test there 
were no press accounts on the need for civilian 
defence in the Globe & Mail or the Montreal 
Gazette.
 In fact, civil defence planning had started in 
Canada, but only recently and on a small scale. 
In 1948 Major-General F.F. Worthington was 
appointed Federal Civil Defence Coordinator 
and he spent much of his first year on the 
job studying civil defence in various countries 
around the world, attending civil defence training 
in Britain and surveying existing civil defence 
preparations across Canada.7 In 1949 some 
civil defence measures began to be developed 
and implemented. One of the first nation-wide 
measures was an effort to standardize fire 
equipment, so that hoses from undamaged or 
lightly damaged centres could be connected to 
hydrants in heavily damaged centres.8 Other 
measures taken at this time included plans for 
an attack warning system, mass evacuation, 
designs for shelters and arrangements for the 
care of casualties.9 
 Federal civil defence authorities identified 
cities that would be likely targets because of 
their importance as government or economic 
centres. These included Halifax, Québec City, 
Montréal, Ottawa-Hull, Toronto, Sault Ste. 
Marie, Sarnia, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary 
and Vancouver. The list would be revised and 
amended many times in the years to come as 
cities changed in importance.10 In these cities 
civil defence preparations would be especially 
important. In this early stage of civil defence 
planning the responsibilities of the various levels 
of government were also decided upon by the 
federal government as follows:
Federal: To assess and keep under continuous 
review the forms and scales of attack to be 
anticipated in the event of war and to initiate 
and guide planning of appropriate civil defence 
measures; to organize federal services for civil 
defence; to coordinate plans and activities of the 
provinces and municipalities.
Provincial: To prepare regional plans and 
responsible for preparatory and other measures 
within their area; to coordinate activities of 
municipalities, to organize provincial services 
for civil defence.
Municipal: To be responsible for local planning 
and for organizing municipal services for civil 
defence; to be responsible for coordinating 
all services and implementing all civil defence 
measures in the municipal area.11
As this document suggests, although civil defence 
policy was formulated for the most part at the 
Major-General F.F. Worthington was appointed Federal 
Civil Defence Coordinator in 1948.  Previous to that he had 
had a distinguished career in the Canadian military during 
the First and Second World Wars, and was regarded as a 
Canadian pioneer in tank warfare.  
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federal and provincial levels, plans as to how civil 
defence was to be carried out on the ground and 
implementation of those plans were a municipal 
responsibility.
 Civil defence preparations would continue in 
1950 with renewed public interest as international 
events such as the victory of the Communist forces 
in China’s civil war in 1949 and the outbreak of 
the Korean War in June 1950 raised the public 
perception that a third world war might break 
out in the near future.12 
 In August 1950 representatives of the federal 
and provincial governments met in Ottawa for a 
Dominion-Provincial conference on civil defence. 
In his opening statement, Minister of National 
Defence Brooke Claxton informed those gathered 
of the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union 
and of the proposed measures to protect civilians. 
Claxton informed the delegates that the Russians 
were in possession of “aircraft of the B-29 type 
capable of delivering atomic or conventional 
bombs” to North America.13 In addition to 
describing the nature of the threat, the Dominion-
Provincial conference also provided many specific 
details as to what form civil defence was to take. 
The conference recommended the protection of 
Canada’s vital points, which it defined as those 
establishments, industrial or administrative, 
“essential to the prosecution of a war or to the 
maintenance of basic economic life and for which 
there is no satisfactory alternative.” These vital 
points were to be assessed by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) and to receive adequate 
protection. This included measures to prevent 
sabotage, such as the installation of fencing, and 
the stationing of guards.14
 The Dominion-Provincial Conference report 
also recommended that the country be divided 
into three types of areas – “target areas,” 
“cushion areas,” and “reception areas” – each 
with its own role in the event of enemy attack. 
The report argued that these target areas 
should be organized immediately for civil 
defence in order to minimize the effects of an 
attack. In addition to fire and police personnel, 
target areas were to have a headquarters with 
communications and reconnaissance wings 
and five main units: wardens, rescue, pioneer, 
welfare, and ambulance.15 The “cushion area” 
which surrounded the target area should be of 
sufficient size to provide aid to the stricken city 
and immediate aid to distressed people. These 
areas were to be strong in the rescue, pioneer, 
welfare, and ambulance elements of civil defence. 
Finally the “reception area” was to provide refuge, 
shelter, and aid to refugees who could not be 
accommodated in the “cushion area.” Most of 
the smaller cities and rural areas in Canada 
would be designated reception areas.16 It is 
interesting to note that this document was not 
advocating evacuation of the target areas prior 
to an attack; rather it anticipated that survivors 
of an attack would exit the area afterwards. Civil 
defence officials anticipated that survival would 
be possible in shelters of the type used in Britain 
during the Second World War.17 But unlike the 
experience of Britain in the Second World War 
little effort was made in these years to construct 
large public shelters of the type used in London 
during the war. Some did suggest that the Toronto 
subway stations then under construction could 
be used as shelters, but such action was not 
taken.18
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 Nevertheless, pre-attack evacuation was not 
completely ruled out. A three-stage evacuation 
process was recommended if it were deemed 
possible. In the first stage those non-essential to 
the war effort – children up to age 12, expectant 
mothers, and aged people, for example, would 
be evacuated. Second, those essential to the 
war effort, but not required in the immediately 
vulnerable area, were to be evacuated. Finally 
key citizens who had to remain close to their 
jobs in a key industry or utility or administrative 
unit would be evacuated.19 Civil defence officials 
were reluctant to recommend mass evacuation 
of target areas for fear of the effect evacuating 
workers would have on the economy and on 
the production of essential war materials. In 
addition, plans at this stage were still based on 
the effects of the “standard,” or Hiroshima-sized, 
A-bomb (roughly 20,000 kilotons or the effect of 
20,000 tons of TNT). Therefore it was felt that 
methods similar to those used in the Second 
World War, such as air raid shelters including 
improvised facilities like subway stations, would 
provide adequate protection.
 In addition to organization at the federal 
and provincial levels, some municipalities 
also began to organize in 1950. In Toronto, 
the municipal council in conjunction with the 
County of York decided to establish a civil defence 
committee which was immediately to begin 
registering volunteers for the various divisions 
of civil defence. An initial budget of $2,000 was 
established for the group. However, it was noted 
by the city council that the municipality had 
not yet received enough information from the 
province to proceed, so initially only a skeleton 
organization was organized.20 
 On 23 February 1951, the second Dominion- 
Provincial Conference on Civil Defence was 
held in Ottawa. Claxton closed his remarks 
with several recommendations including that 
civil defence organization be completed at the 
provincial and municipal levels, that training of 
civil defence personnel continue, that a campaign 
of public information be started, and that the 
provision of warning devices and specialized civil 
defence equipment be carried out. Finally Claxton 
announced that civil defence was, for the most 
part, not a federal responsibility and therefore 
should not be the responsibility of National 
Defence; civil defence would be transferred to the 
Department of National Health and Welfare under 
Paul Martin.21 Civil defence was considered to 
be primarily a local responsibility because to 
be effective civil defence plans would have to be 
adapted to local circumstances and carried out 
by the local authorities. The suggestion that civil 
defence be transferred to another department 
was not a new one. In the House of Commons 
opposition members had been suggesting for 
several weeks that the defence minister was 
carrying a great burden and that civil defence as 
a civilian activity be transferred from National 
Defence to another department.22 
 Shortly after receiving responsibility for civil 
defence the Department of National Health and 
Welfare released an instructional booklet entitled 
Personal Protection Under Atomic Attack. The 
booklet advised building shelters in cellars or 
backyards and compared building a shelter 
to other normal precautions such as “putting 
a lightning rod on the roof or anti-freeze in a 
car.”23 The blast and initial heat effects of the 
atomic bomb were viewed as the greatest threat. 
Therefore, the booklet advised citizens to get rid 
of fire hazards, cover windows with plywood, 
and have pails of water or sand at hand to fight 
fires. The third effect of the bomb, radiation, was 
dismissed by the booklet: there was no reason 
to become “panicky” about radioactivity as like 
an x-ray the radioactivity in a nuclear attack 
would last for only about a minute and any 
lingering radioactive particles would be scattered 
over so many miles that they would no longer 
be dangerous.24 As this booklet demonstrates, 
during this period citizens were expected to take 
shelter within their own homes; government 
literature did not recommend evacuation and 
often downplayed the effects of a nuclear attack. 
The atomic bomb was represented to the public 
as being just another way of causing an explosion, 
just one more powerful than a conventional 
weapon.25 
 The years 1954 to 1957 would mark a major 
transition in civil defence planning. The advent 
of the much more powerful H-bomb and the 
discovery of radioactive fallout would lead to a 
focus on mass evacuation as the only means of 
survival for those within target areas. Warnings 
about the destructive power of the hydrogen 
bomb had been discussed in the press for years. 
Articles predicted that the hydrogen bomb would 
give a significant political advantage to whichever 
superpower was the first to produce such a 
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weapon and in the years prior to the first H-bomb 
explosion there were many articles that expressed 
fear that the Soviet Union had already discovered the 
technology.26
 In early 1954 the United States began tests of 
hydrogen bombs on the Bikini Atoll in the South 
Pacific, the results of which were shocking.27 Beyond 
the enormity of the explosions themselves the 
real surprise was the distance that concentrated 
amounts of radioactive debris (fallout) from the 
explosion travelled from the site of detonation. 
The “phenomenon of ‘fallout’” was the primary 
focus of a report issued by the US Atomic Energy 
Commission in February of 1955 on the tests.28 
The report stated that fallout from the March 
1954 thermonuclear bomb test at the Bikini 
Atoll was deposited in varying amounts that 
contaminated an elliptical area that extended 
220 miles downwind and varied in width up 
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to 40 miles. The report went on to estimate the 
effect this widespread fallout would have on a 
populated area. Assuming that people had taken 
no precautions, had remained outdoors without 
shelter, and had been exposed for 36 hours and 
therefore received a maximum dose, there was 
“sufficient radioactivity in a down-wind belt 
about 140 miles in length and of varying width 
up to 20 miles to have seriously threatened the 
lives of nearly all persons in the area who did 
not take protective measures.”29 This discovery 
would change civil defence plans not only in 
designated target areas but also in communities 
downwind from potential targets. Of course 
fallout had always resulted from previous A-bomb 
explosions, but the H-bomb tests revealed just 
how widespread and deadly fallout could be. 
 When asked in the House of Commons how 
the test of a hydrogen bomb and the discovery 
of radioactive fallout would affect Canada’s civil 
defence, Paul Martin responded that they would 
need to be re-examined.30 On 28 April 1954 
Paul Martin asked the civil defence committee to 
determine if population dispersal was a possibility, 
if medical stockpiles should be increased (as the 
current stock pile had been planned for a 20 
kiloton bomb), and if shelters could be used.31 In 
a speech to the Corps of Imperial Frontiersmen 
in June of 1954, Major-General Matthew Penhale, 
Commandant of Canada’s Civil Defence College 
at Arnprior, Ontario,32 noted that the destructive 
power of the H-bomb increased the possible zone 
of destruction from three to seven miles up to 10 
to 15 miles. Such a bomb, Penhale noted, would 
leave no portion of any Canadian city without 
damage.33 Therefore taking shelter within a target 
city or evacuating the population to the immediate 
outskirts of a city would no longer be effective.
 In a speech reprinted in the Civil Defence 
Bulletin for June 1954, Paul Martin put forth 
three considerations for any future plans. First, 
early warning of an approaching attack had 
become increasingly important. Second, the 
days of local, and self sufficient, civil defence 
organizations were over now that the possible 
area of destruction had become so large. Third, 
the H-bomb did not eliminate the possibility of 
an attack by other means.34 A similar message 
was touted by the civil defence coordinator for 
the Metropolitan Region of Montreal, Lieutenant-
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Colonel W.A. Croteau, who in an interview for the 
Montreal Gazette stressed the importance of early 
warning, and urged traffic engineers to examine 
the possibility of planning for evacuation.35
 At the local level in 1954, there was also 
some progress. Attempting to quiet complaints 
that too heavy a burden had been placed on 
municipalities in the federal government’s 
civil defence plan, Paul Martin announced the 
intention to share the expense of civil defence 
among the three levels of government. The plan 
called for the federal government to assume 50 
percent of the cost of all approved civil defence 
projects with the provincial and municipal 
governments each paying 25 percent of the 
cost. This was a significant change as prior to 
this reform municipalities, with the aid of the 
provincial government in some cases, were 
responsible for providing the entire civil defence 
budget save for programs such as fire equipment 
standardization where each level of government 
paid one-third of the costs. Responding to this 
plan Conservative opposition leader George Drew 
noted that many provinces (most notably Ontario 
and Quebec) had not agreed to the formula, and 
that therefore municipalities would still be left 
on their own to fund civil defence projects.36 
 As civil defence plans shifted away from air 
raid shelters toward a policy of mass evacuation 
in 1954 and 1955 much attention became focused 
on how to make evacuation of Canada’s largest 
cities possible. On 2 February 1956 Federal 
Civil Defence Coordinator F.F. Worthington sent 
a copy of a provisional civil defence plan to all 
Provincial Coordinators. The plan called for 
mass evacuation of 12 target areas.37 Evacuation 
was to take place in four phases. Phase A called 
for the evacuation of non-essential civilians 
when intelligence and a deteriorating world 
situation indicated that an attack was about to 
be launched. Phase B called for the withdrawal 
of the remaining population as the enemy 
approached Canada. Phases C and D called for 
the return to the city of emergency workers and 
for civil defence workers to search for survivors, 
provide aid, and begin rehabilitation. The plan 
assumed that in any future war nuclear weapons 
would be used against North America from the 
beginning. Furthermore it was believed that the 
first few days of a nuclear war would be the 
worst. Finally it was assumed that Canada would 
receive a minimum of three hours notice of an 
approaching attack from the radar lines in the 
north, which would provide adequate time for 
the evacuation of cities. However the plan noted 
that many Canadian cities would not be hit in 
the first wave of attacks as most of the primary 
targets were in the United States; this too would 
provide more time for evacuation.38
 On 27 July 1956 Paul Martin announced that 
evacuation was official civil defence policy in the 
House of Commons during the debate on the 
estimates. “Our Civil Defence policy,” he stated, 
“should now be based on the development and 
testing of plans for the orderly evacuation on 
short notice of the main urban areas in Canada 
should the possibility of attack on such areas by 
nuclear weapons appear to be imminent.” To this 
end Martin requested a civil defence budget of 
$7,010,018 or approximately 43 cents per capita. 
The majority of the federal civil defence budget, 
about 34 percent, would be spent on the medical 
stockpiling program, with 29 percent going to the 
provinces and municipalities and 10 percent to 
the civil defence college at Arnprior.39
 The announcement of a new federal civil 
defence policy was a long time coming, but 
only a few months later there were signs that 
it would soon be obsolete. By April 1956 both 
superpowers had begun to experiment with short-
range ballistic missiles. Although a perfected 
design and mass production of missiles were still 
sometime in the future, it was a sign that civil 
defence plans would soon need to be revised.40
 Throughout the early part of 1957 mass 
evacuation remained the principle means of 
civil defence. Metropolitan Toronto City Council 
minutes reveal that much of the discussion 
of civil defence in that area focused on the 
Canadian Civil Defence
Health worker’s armband
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construction and improvement of highways to 
make evacuation of the city possible. In January 
1957 Metro Council requested that the provincial 
and federal governments become involved in 
the construction of the Don Valley Parkway 
and the Lakeshore Expressway as part of their 
contribution to civil defence.41 This request for 
assistance was rejected in March 1957 by the 
Department of Public Works, which argued that 
while the project contributed to civil defence it 
was a provincial and municipal responsibility to 
construct such highways.42
 Nuclear attack by ICBMs became all the 
more probable when the Soviet Union launched 
the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on 4 October 
1957. Early newspaper reports focused on the 
scientific achievement Sputnik represented,43 
yet it was hard to miss the fact that the rocket 
that launched a peaceful satellite orbiting the 
earth could become a guided missile with a 
hydrogen bomb warhead. The development of 
ICBMs held major implications for civil defence 
planning. Mass evacuation was based on the 
assumption that an enemy attack would involve 
manned bombers, and Canadian cities would 
receive a minimum of three hours’ warning from 
the radar lines of an impending attack. ICBMs 
would shorten the warning period considerably 
and increase the possibility of a surprise attack 
in which no warning would be received.
 In 1958 the recently-elected Diefenbaker 
government appointed the retiring Chief of 
the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Howard 
Graham, to conduct a review of civil defence 
policy and recommend changes which should 
be undertaken in response to the development of 
ICBMs.44 At this same time greater responsibility 
was taken on by the federal government, which 
assigned the militia some duties previously 
assigned to civil defence volunteers and local 
organizations. In the House of Commons 
Diefenbaker’s Minister of National Defence, G. 
R. Pearkes, explained that some militia units 
would be organized into approximately 50 
mobile columns consisting of reconnaissance 
companies, rescue companies, and traffic control 
units designed to help implement civil defence 
measures in the event of enemy attack.45 Pearkes 
went on to stress that “the appearance of an 
organized, disciplined, uniformed body would 
do more to restore morale than almost anything 
else.”46 This comment suggests that Pearkes may 
have felt that the current volunteer civil defence 
organization was not up to the task and would 
not be able to restore morale, a message which 
the former minister in charge of civil defence, 
Paul Martin, stated had upset many people in 
Canada who felt that adequate civil defence could 
be provided without the military.47
 The Diefenbaker government became focused 
on preserving civilian government in Canada, a 
new aspect of civil defence which would become 
known as continuity of government. As early as 
1957 documents were circulated by federal civil 
defence authorities that stressed the importance 
of having an operational civilian government to 
respond to the crisis following a nuclear attack 
in order to co-ordinate the distribution of food, 
fuel, and other essential supplies, maintain law 
and order, allocate manpower, conduct foreign 
relations regarding the war, and manage public 
finances. A 1957 document considered three 
courses of action. The first was to provide 
protection for the government within the capital. 
This approach it was argued would require 
maximum protection and would therefore 
be prohibitively expensive. A second option 
involved relocating each unit of government 
outside the probable target area. The third and 
recommended option was to provide a re-located 
seat of the federal government outside Ottawa, 
with a number of federal/provincial regions 
and federal/provincial sub-regions across the 
country. This would allow for the government 
to function independently in each region until 
communication facilities and other basic services 
were restored.48 As early as 1957 civil defence 
officials were preparing to build shelters to 
ensure the survival of key government officials 
in various locations across the country. 
 Graham handed his report to the Diefenbaker 
government in early 1959. The report was kept 
confidential and therefore not discussed in 
parliament or in the press.49 Some of Graham’s 
recommendations were later published in his 
memoirs. He advised that a close relationship 
between civil defence and the military should 
exist. Furthermore Graham noted that an attack 
was unlikely, but suggested that once hostilities 
commenced the warning period would be short, 
possibly a matter of minutes. He also concluded 
that the mass evacuation of cities was not only 
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impractical, but also unacceptable to the public. 
Finally Graham recommended that the federal 
government should assume sole responsibility 
for civil defence.50 Graham’s recommendations 
for improving civil defence in Canada were 
obviously aimed at complaints that Canadians 
were uninterested in civil defence, that plans 
were unrealistic, and that municipalities were 
ill-equipped to bear the cost of civil defence.
 Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced a new 
civil defence policy in the House of Commons 
on 23 March 1959. The federal government 
did assume some responsibilities which were 
previously assigned to the provinces and 
municipalities, but responsibility for civil defence 
was not placed solely under National Defence as 
Graham had recommended. The military was 
assigned a number of the technical civil defence 
functions, for example sounding warning signals, 
and tracking fallout. Humanitarian tasks such as 
providing for the sick, injured, and displaced, and 
providing emergency accommodation remained 
the responsibility of the Department of National 
Health and Welfare as well as the provinces and 
municipalities. Finally the Emergency Measures 
Organization (EMO), a division within the Privy 
Council Office and thus the responsibility of the 
Prime Minister, was to assume a coordinating 
role between the various departments and 
carry out responsibilities not assigned to other 
departments.51 The federal government also 
assumed a greater portion of the financial 
responsibility for civil defence – fully three-
quarters – leaving the provincial governments to 
pay 15 percent and the municipal governments 
to pay ten percent.52 This new funding formula 
prompted those provinces and municipalities 
which had previously refused to fund or cancelled 
their civil defence programs to allocate funds.53 
 Diefenbaker’s announcement did leave a 
major aspect of civil defence policy undefined. 
As Paul Martin pointed out, the prime minister’s 
announcement did not specify whether or not 
evacuation was still the principle means of civil 
defence.54 The government would not have an 
answer to this question until July 1959 when 
Minister of National Health and Welfare J.W. 
Monteith announced that studies conducted 
by the Rand Corporation and the US Congress 
suggested that the best means of protection from 
ICBMs would be to construct shelters capable of 
shielding individuals from fallout.55 In the months 
ahead many different ideas as to what form 
shelter construction should take would emerge, 
but ultimately the government and the civil 
defence organization would promote basement 
fallout shelters which could be constructed by 
individuals in their home basements for a cost 
of about $500.56
 In the years that immediately followed 
the 1959 changes in civil defence policy, 
developments focused on two main areas – the 
implementation of the home shelter policy and 
the protection for continuity of government. The 
effort to encourage individuals to construct home 
fallout shelters was met for the most part with 
frustration. Although the government published 
booklets such as 11 Steps to Survival (1961) and 
Your Basement Fallout Shelter (1961), which 
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encouraged shelter construction and provided 
instructions as to how to construct a shelter, the 
number of individuals who chose to build home 
shelters was disappointing. 
 As well the government did undertake 
shelter construction to ensure the continuity 
of government. The Diefenbaker government 
authorized the construction of an emergency 
regional site in each province from which federal, 
provincial and military personnel could operate 
during a nuclear war, independently if need 
be, to coordinate the war effort and survival 
operations.57 Known as BRIDGE Installations, 
each of these 58 fallout shelters of varying sizes 
were constructed outside the provincial capitals, 
Ottawa58 and various regional headquarters, 
and were to house a mix of essential provincial, 
federal, and military personnel. The shelters 
were to offer protection from fallout, though 
not blast damage, construction costs were paid 
by the federal government, and each location 
was to be linked to the others by an emergency 
communication system.59 Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker was not to be evacuated to the so 
called “Diefenbunker,” the Federal government’s 
emergency site outside Ottawa. Instead as 
Diefenbaker explained to parliament, a shelter 
These are the fold-out plans contained in the pamphlet, Your Basement Fallout Shelter.
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exactly like the shelters ordinary Canadians 
were advised to build in their own homes was 
constructed at his official residence, 24 Sussex 
Drive. As Diefenbaker exclaimed, “that is where 
I shall be when and if war should come.”60 
 During the years 1948 to 1963 Canada’s 
Civil Defence policy was continuously revised 
and adapted to changes in technology, weaponry, 
scientific discovery and world politics. In the 
years after 1963 civil defence policy would remain 
much the same and it would be the organization 
itself which would have to change in order to 
remain viable in the face of a growing public 
perception that civil defence efforts were futile 
and unnecessary. Although many civil defence 
measures such as the BRIDGE shelters would 
remain in use, in some cases into the 1990s, an 
increased willingness on the part of US and USSR 
to use negotiation to avoid nuclear war led civil 
defence organizations to redefine themselves.61 
 Historian Costia Nikitiuk documents this 
change within civil defence organizations using 
the example of the British Columbia civil defence 
organization. He argues that British Columbia’s 
civil defence organization evolved over time 
from an organization originally intended to deal 
with the emergency situation of nuclear war in 
the early 1950s into an organization designed 
to handle everyday emergencies such as forest 
fires, floods, and earthquakes by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.62 Nititiuk argues that these 
changes occurred as “the public lost confidence 
in the ability of civil defence organizations to 
make realistic preparations for war.”63 In fact, 
from the outset civil defence organizations were 
designed to be “dual-use” organizations focused 
on planning for nuclear war, but able to respond 
to more everyday emergencies such as floods, 
fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. 
As early as 1950 MPs in the House of Commons 
suggested that Canada’s civil defence organization 
should be set up in such a way that it would be 
not only be useful in the event of nuclear war, but 
also for natural disasters.64
 The study of Canada’s civil defence 
preparations adds much to our understanding 
of Canada’s participation in the Cold War. 
Canada’s involvement in the Cold War is most 
often compared to the experience in the United 
States. In this respect Canada is often said to have 
been more calm, deliberate, and at times more 
rational.65 Nevertheless it is widely recognized 
in the historiography that in many respects the 
Cold War was largely a psychological war which 
created a culture of fear which permeated every 
aspect of Canadian society.66 It is in this respect 
that civil defence has been an overlooked aspect 
of Canada’s Cold War history. As this study 
has demonstrated, Canadians were concerned 
about the possibility of nuclear war and many 
precautions were implemented to aid the survival 
of the population. Millions of dollars were spent 
on infrastructure and programs intended to 
protect and educate Canadians in preparation for 
nuclear war. In this way civil defence provided a 
means through which Canadians could cope with 
the psychological aspects of the Cold War.
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